Donald Trump’s 2024 election victory raised concern among Saskatchewan exporters because he had proposed tariffs of 10 to 20 per cent on imported products. The province’s agriculture and resource economy depends heavily on international markets, making even an uncertain campaign threat relevant to producers, processors and communities.
Why tariffs worried exporters
A tariff is collected by the importing country, generally from the importer, but its cost can be shared through lower prices paid to suppliers, higher prices for customers or reduced sales. Saskatchewan businesses could therefore feel a U.S. tariff even though they would not necessarily write the cheque at the border.
Gunter Jochum, president of the Wheat Growers Association, said a 10 per cent measure would be substantial and could place Canadian products at a disadvantage. He also cautioned that it was unclear whether campaign language would become policy or what exemptions might apply.
Saskatchewan’s exposure
The province exports agricultural commodities, crude oil, potash, uranium and manufactured goods. U.S. buyers are important, while many commodities also trade at global prices. The effect of a tariff would vary by product, contract, transport route and availability of alternative suppliers.
Farmers can be exposed indirectly if processors or buyers reduce bids to cover a border charge. A weaker Canadian dollar might offset part of the price difference for some exports while raising the cost of imported machinery and inputs. Those interactions make a single province-wide loss estimate unreliable without a specified policy.
Lessons from earlier measures
Canadian businesses had already experienced U.S. metal tariffs during Trump’s first term, including a 10 per cent aluminum measure imposed again on most Canadian aluminum in 2020. Past action made the new threats credible enough to plan for, but it did not establish that every product would receive identical treatment.
Christopher Sands of the Wilson Center advised taking the threat seriously without panicking. Tariff threats can be a negotiating instrument as well as an intended policy. Canada needed evidence about integrated supply chains and a plan for either outcome.
What preparation could include
Governments and exporters can map which products enter the United States, which contracts allocate tariff costs and where alternative markets or processing capacity exist. Industry associations can identify American customers and workers who would also be harmed and present that information to decision-makers.
Diversifying trade is a long-term safeguard, not an overnight replacement for the nearest large market. New buyers require infrastructure, standards, relationships and competitive shipping. Retaliatory tariffs may create leverage but can also raise Canadian prices, so they should be targeted and openly justified.
A scenario, not a foregone conclusion
The report was published immediately after the election, before the incoming administration had issued a detailed tariff schedule. It was therefore correct to describe possible impact rather than a completed trade loss.
Businesses should avoid irreversible decisions based on a headline alone while still testing cash flow under higher border costs. Lenders and governments can prepare temporary support tied to demonstrable harm rather than promising blanket compensation in advance.
Saskatchewan’s vulnerability came from its export success and concentration in a major market. Its leverage came from products U.S. buyers need. Careful preparation meant quantifying both sides, pursuing exemptions under continental trade rules and building alternatives without exaggerating either the certainty of a tariff or the ease of escaping it.
