Germany Accuses Woman of Spying for China on Arms Exports
German federal prosecutors arrested a Chinese national identified as Yaqi X. on September 30, 2024, accusing her of passing information from Leipzig/Halle Airport to an alleged Chinese intelligence operative. The material concerned flights, passengers, cargo and transports connected with military equipment and a German defence company.
Her airport job provided unusual access
Prosecutors said X. worked for a logistics company serving the airport. Between August 2023 and February 2024, she allegedly collected operational information not intended for public release.
Leipzig/Halle is an important freight hub. Routine logistics records can become sensitive when they reveal the timing, route and participants in military transport.
The alleged recipient had already been arrested
Authorities accused X. of supplying Jian G., a former assistant to German member of the European Parliament Maximilian Krah. G. had been arrested in April 2024 on suspicion of acting for a Chinese intelligence service.
Krah, associated with the far-right Alternative for Germany, said he had no knowledge of his aide’s activities. An employee’s prosecution did not by itself establish that the politician participated.
The initial account was an accusation
At arrest, prosecutors described an urgent suspicion under German law. X. was entitled to a defence and a court determination.
Nationality or access to information is not evidence of espionage on its own. The case depended on alleged collection, communication and intent.
China rejected European spying allegations
Chinese officials have repeatedly accused Western governments of exaggerating espionage claims to discredit China. That denial forms part of the diplomatic record but does not replace examination of evidence in court.
Germany, for its part, warned that Chinese intelligence targeted politics, technology, dissidents and commercial knowledge. Broad threat assessments should not be used to stigmatize Chinese communities.
The case proceeded to a joint trial
X. and G. were tried before the Higher Regional Court in Dresden. X. acknowledged providing airport information to G., while the court examined whether the conduct amounted to intelligence activity for a foreign power.
Proceedings also concerned G.’s collection of European Parliament information and identification of Chinese opposition figures, which extended beyond the airport allegations.
The court later convicted both defendants
On September 30, 2025, the court convicted X. and sentenced her to one year and nine months in prison, suspended for three years. G. received four years and nine months for an especially serious case of intelligence activity.
The court found that they collected and transmitted flight, freight and passenger data, particularly concerning military transports. The judgment was subject to the available appeal process.
Insider access requires layered controls
Airports and contractors can limit sensitive records by job role, log unusual searches, separate duties and train employees to report approaches. Vetting alone cannot predict every future act.
Security must also respect labour rights and data protection. Continuous suspicion based on origin is both unjust and ineffective.
The later verdict changes the historical framing
The October 2024 headline correctly described an accusation, because no conviction yet existed. A complete account must now add that a German court found X. guilty after trial rather than retroactively describing the original allegation as proven at arrest.
The case showed how ordinary logistics data can expose defence movement and how a parliamentary espionage investigation can reach linked private-sector access. It also demonstrates the value of precise stages: suspicion justified arrest, evidence was tested in court, and the later judgment—not nationality or political association—established criminal liability.
